



UHF
Department of State

(10)
TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 5663Q
RECD: JUN 21, 1970
4:36 P.M.

P 211353Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4127
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 RAWALPINDI 5012

KODIS

SUBJECT: MILITARY SUPPLY: ARMS FOR PAKISTAN

REF: STATE 96236

1. DISCUSSION OF LONG AWAITED MESSAGE ON OUR REVIEW OF MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY OCCUPIED MAJOR PORTION OF MY 70-MINUTE MEETING WITH PRS. YAHYA AT PRESIDENT'S HOUSE IN KARACHI ON JUNE 20. I HAD REQUESTED SPECIFICALLY MEETING WITH YAHYA, BUT FONSEC SULTAN KHAN (WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING YAHYA ON VISIT TO USSR INCOMING WEEK) WAS ALSO PRESENT. NO ONE ELSE ATTENDED. ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT WAS RELAXED AND THOROUGHLY FRIENDLY.

2. AS SOON AS I TURNED TO ARMS ISSUE, YAHYA INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD HAD INTIMATION FROM AME. HILALY OF SOME POSITIVE US DECISION AND HAD BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR MEETING.

3. I LED OFF BY READING TEXT OF QUOTED MESSAGE IN REFTEL. THEN I MADE THE ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY POINTS FOLLOWING PRECISELY THE GUIDANCE IN REFTEL.

4. YAHYA IMMEDIATELY EXCLAIMED THAT HE WAS DEEPLY PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF PRESIDENT'S ACTION. HE KNEW WHAT A DIFFICULT PROBLEM THIS HAD PRESENTED FOR US AND THE PRESSURES AGAINST ANY POSITIVE STEP. CONTINUING, YAHYA SAID THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IS NOT ONLY A GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP, BUT ALSO EVIDENCE THAT THE US UNDERSTANDS PAKISTAN'S PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES. THIS STEP, HE ADDED, GIVES EFFECT TO THE SYMPATHETIC CONCERN AND INTEREST THE PRESIDENT HAD INDICATED TO HIM AT LAHORE LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN AND US ARE NOT CLOSELY ALIGNED AS THEY WERE, YAHYA STATED HE CONSIDERED THIS A CONCRETE EXAMPLE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES CAN NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER.

5. AS TO EXECUTING THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, YAHYA SAID THE DETAILS CAN BE WORKED OUT IN DUE TIME BY OUR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES. ON THE QUESTION OF CASH SALES, HE COMMENTED RUEFULLY THAT QUOTE PAKISTAN IS BROKE AND EVERYONE KNOWS IT ... YOU BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE UNQUOTE, BUT HE DID NOT LEAN ON THIS POINT AND HE STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO LEAVE ANY NEGATIVE IMPRESSION. YAHYA DID NOT COMMENT SPECIFICALLY ON ANY OF WEAPONRY

~~SECRET~~

-2- RAWALPINDI 5012, SECTION 1 OF 2, JUN 21

WHICH I MENTIONED AS INSTRUCTED REFTTEL, OTHER THAN ON TANKS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE VALUED ABOVE ALL THE FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION EVIDENCED. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT PAK ARMY BADLY NEEDED TO REPLENISH ITS TANK INVENTORY AND WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE SEEK SUPPLIES. HE DID NOT EXPRESS PARTICULAR CURRENT INTEREST IN M47'S OFFERED BY TURKEY, COMMENTING THAT THEY WERE APPARENTLY IN EVEN WORSE CONDITION THAN PAKISTAN'S OWN TANKS. BUT YAHYA LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT HE WAS SORRY WE HAD BEEN UNABLE ACCOMMODATE PAKISTAN ON TANKS, TO WHICH THEY OBVIOUSLY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE.

6. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON RELATED TO CURRENT ARMS DECISION, CONVERSATION TURNED BRIEFLY TO CAMBODIAN SITUATION. I SAID PRES. NIXON HAD HAD TO ANTICIPATE HEAVY FLAK ON DOMESTIC FRONT IN SENDING US TROOPS INTO LIMITED ACTION IN CAMBODIA. YAHYA RESPONDED THAT AS MILITARY MAN HE UNDERSTOOD REASONS INVOLVED IN CAMBODIAN ACTION. HE REALIZED THAT CAMBODIAN SITUATION HAD COMPOUNDED PRESIDENT'S PROBLEMS IN COMING TO HIS DECISION ON ARMS FOR PAKISTAN, AND THIS ADDED TO HIS APPRECIATION.

7. I CAME DOWN HEAVILY ON NEED FOR UTMOST SECRECY CONCERNING OUR ARMS OFFER, ESPECIALLY PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF OUR CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS. SAID THERE WERE ONLY TWO OFFICERS ON MY STAFF WHO WERE INFORMED. BOTH YAHYA AND FONSEC EXPRESSED FULL RECOGNITION OF NEED FOR HIGHEST SECRECY. FONSEC NOTED THAT WHEREAS THREE OFFICIALS OF AMERICAN EMBASSY WERE IN THE KNOW, ON PAK SIDE THERE WERE ONLY PRESIDENT AND HIMSELF.

8. YAHYA SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS AT ONCE HIS PERSONAL APPRECIATION TO PRES. NIXON OF LATTER'S ACTION, AND THAT HE WOULD DO SO BY MESSAGE THROUGH AMB. HILALY. ALTHOUGH I FELT CONCERN OVER SPREAD OF INFORMATION AND REITERATED THAT HIGHEST SECRECY WAS ESSENTIAL, I DID NOT CONSIDER THAT I COULD VETO YAHYA'S PROPOSAL TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIS OWN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. ASSUME DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE WILL UNDERSCORE SECRECY REQUIREMENT WITH HILALY AS NEEDED.

9. WE AGREED THAT FOR PURPOSES OF PUBLICITY, MY DELIVERY OF MOON SURFACE PARTICLES AND OF PRES. NIXON'S REPLY TO IZMIR LETTER WOULD BE GIVEN OUT AS REASON FOR MY CALL ON YAHYA. LOCAL PRESS JUNE 21 PROMINENTLY REPORTED MY CALL THAT WAY.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 5664Q
RECD: JUN 21, 197
3:41 P.M.

P 211400Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4128
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 RAWALPINDI 5012

NODIS

SUBJECT: MILITARY SUPPLY: ARMS FOR PAKISTAN

REF: STATE 96236

10. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THIS HAS BEEN A VALUABLE EXERCISE AND I WISH TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL PLEASURE AND APPRECIATION FOR DECISION TAKEN BY PRESIDENT.

[garble]

11. A ZQVBR BENEFIT OF PRESIDENT'S ACTION IS PSYCHOLOGICAL. SEEMS ONLY PRUDENT TO NOTE THAT EVEN SUCH BENEFIT STILL SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN PURSUING ACTION TO ITS CONCLUSION. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW OUR OFFER OF SOME F-104'S, AS WELL AS APC'S AND FEW MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT, CAN BE WORKED OUT IN PRACTICE GIVEN CERTAIN POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS IN MEETING PRECISE PAK REQUIREMENTS AND CASH PAYMENT CAPABILITY. OBVIOUSLY PAKISTAN WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR BULK OF ITS ARMAMENT. BUT IN ANY EVENT PRESIDENT'S DECISION HAS ALREADY GIVEN US AN IMPORTANT BOOST AS REFLECTED IN YAHYA'S VERY POSITIVE REACTION AND IT AUGURS WELL FOR OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN. GOP WILL SEE IT AS PROOF THAT WE HAVE NOT OPTED ENTIRELY AGAINST PAKISTAN ON MATTER WHICH, WHATEVER OUR OWN VIEW, HAS ASSUMED GREAT IMPORTANCE AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT. I BELIEVE OUR DECISION ON THIS MATTER HAS BEEN SOUND AND WILL PROMOTE US INTEREST.

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